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NOTES
THE INDIAN GAMING REGULATORY AcT AND THE ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT: STATES ASSERT SOVEREIGN IMMUNITy
DEFENSE TO SLOW THE GROWTH OF
INDIAN GAMING
I firmly believe that we now stand at a crossroads, at a point where we may
seize the opportunity to acknowledge the Indians' unequivocal right to self-
determination and invite the Indian tribes into the American main-
stream.... [T]he possibility [exists] that the tribes can fully participate in
our economic prosperity while they retain ... their rights to decide to what
extent and in what manner they choose to participate.'
In 1988, Congress enacted the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
(IGRA)2 to promote "tribal economic development, self-sutficiency, and
strong tribal governments."3 Initially, the Act was successful, and its
goals were being met.4 However, states have opposed tribal efforts to
1. 134 CONG. REc. 24,027 (1988) (statement of Sen. Evans) (explaining why the Indian Gam-
ing Regulatory Act should be enacted).
2. 25 U.S.C. § 2701 (1988).
3. Id. § 2702 (1988) (declaring Congress' policy). Section 2702 provides:
The purpose of this chapter is-
(1) to provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of
promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments;
(2) to provide a statutory basis for the regulation of gaming by an Indian tribe adequate to
shield it from organized crime and other corrupting influences, to ensure that the Indian
tribe is the primary beneficiary of the gaming operation, and to assure that gaming is con-
ducted fairly and honestly by both the operator and players; and
(3) to declare that the establishment of independent Federal regulatory authority for gam-
ing on Indian lands, the establishment of Federal standards for gaming on Indian lands,
and the establishment of a National Indian Gaming Commission are necessary to meet
congressional concerns regarding gaming and to protect such gaming as a means of gener-
ating tribal revenue.
4. For example, annual revenues from gambling on reservations have reached $5 billion since
1988. David Holmstrom, Indian Gaming Booms Nationwide, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 10,
1992, at 6. The tribes use the revenues to fund health-care centers, schools, day-care centers, and
other community and economic projects. Id. See also Ken Miller, Gambling Has Made Tribes a
Major Economic Force, GANNET NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 30, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-
brary, Currnt File (stating that while nationwide federal aid has decreased, tribes are using gaming
as the chief means of becoming self-sufficient); George Oake, Natives Set Sights on Casinos as U.S.
Bands Rake in the Cash, TORONTO STAR, Aug. 4, 1992, at A15 (noting that gambling has become
the most successful economic venture for Indians across the United States); Susan Stanich, Indians
Say States Stack Deck Against Reservation Gambling Operations, WAsH. PosT, Aug. 2, 1992, at A16
(reporting that Charles Keechi, President of the Delaware Tribe of Western Oklahoma and Chair-
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expand gambling operations,5 and recently, some states have successfully
prevented tribes from establishing more sophisticated gambling
enterprises.6
The most controversial aspect of IGRA has been the "compacting"
process between the tribes and the states.7 A tribe cannot conduct high-
stakes, or "class III," gambling activities' without a compact, which is
an agreement negotiated between the tribe and the state.' Through
IGRA's jurisdictional provision, section 2710(d)(7), a tribe has a cause of
action in federal district court1" when a state stalls or refuses to negotiate
a compact. Several district courts, however, have ruled that states may
raise an Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity defense to these
claims. These courts have granted the states' motions to dismiss.ll
This Note examines whether section 2710(d)(7) is constitutional under
man of the National Indian Gaming Association, and other tribal leaders assert that gaming opera-
tions have brought hope and economic self-sufficiency to the tribes).
5. See, &g., S. REP. No. 446, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3071, 3103 (additional views of Sen. McCain) (noting that states oppose Indian gaming because
states want to protect their own gaming operations from competition). See also infra notes 22-64
and accompanying text.
6. See, eg., Pueblo of Sandia v. New Mexico, No. 92-0613 JC (D.N.M. Nov. 13, 1992); Ponca
Tribe of Oklahoma v. Oklahoma, No. 92-988-T (W.D. Okla. Sept. 8, 1992); Sault Ste. Marie Tribe
of Chippewa Indians v. Michigan, 800 F. Supp. 1484 (W.D. Mich. 1992); Poarch Band of Creek
Indians v. Alabama, 776 F. Supp. 550 (S.D. Ala. 1991); Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v.
Mississippi, No. CIV.A.J90-0386(B), 1991 WL 255614 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 9, 1991); Spokane Tribe of
Indians v. Washington, 790 F. Supp. 1057 (E.D. Wash. 1991). In these cases, tribes sued to compel
the states to negotiate agreements for high-stakes gambling operations, but the courts dismissed the
suits.
7. The tribal-state "compact" is the instrument Congress devised to enable tribes and states to
negotiate agreements to allow sophisticated gambling operations, such as casinos, on reservations.
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3) (1988). IGRA classifies such sophisticated gambling as "class II" gaming.
25 U.S.C. § 2703(8) (1988). IGRA mandates that United States district courts shall have jurisdic-
tion over suits brought by the tribes "arising from the failure of a State to enter into negotiations
with the Indian tribe for the purpose of entering into a Tribal-State compact ... or to conduct such
negotiations in good faith." 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A) (1988). For the full text of this section, see
infra note 83.
This last provision has been very controversial and is the focus of this Note. In six out of eight
cases, courts have determined that § 2710(d)(7)(A) is unconstitutional and that Congress does not
have the authority to subject states to federal jurisdiction for the purpose of concluding a tribal-state
compact. See infra note 13.
8. IGRA designates the most sophisticated forms of gambling as "class III" activities, See
supra note 7. Jai-alai, casino gambling, parimutuel betting, and dog racing are examples of class III
gaming. 134 CONG. REc. 8,154 (1988) (statement of Rep. Vucanovich).
9. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C) (1988).
10. See infra note 83.
11. See supra note 6.
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the Eleventh Amendment. Only two 12 of the eight federal district
courts13 to address the issue have held that section 2710(d)(7) is constitu-
tional and that Congress has the right to abrogate the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity when legislating pursuant to the Indian Com-
merce Clause."4 This Note argues that the states should not be able to
contravene IGRA's goals by asserting an Eleventh Amendment sover-
eign immunity defense. Moreover, this Note advocates that courts facing
the sovereign immunity issue in Indian gaming cases should pattern their
decisions after Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida15 and Cheyenne River
Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota16 and refuse to grant motions to dismiss
based on an Eleventh Amendment defense.
This Note offers two judicial solutions to the Eleventh Amendment
controversy in class III Indian gaming cases. Part I reviews the histori-
cal background of Indian gaming, examines important pre-IGRA gam-
ing cases, and discusses the legislative history and key provisions of
IGRA. Part II notes the tribes' early successes in establishing class III
gambling operations under IGRA. Part III analyzes the history of the
Eleventh Amendment and the state sovereign immunity doctrine. Part
IV discusses the eight Eleventh Amendment-Indian gaming cases 17 that
have been decided to date. Part V demonstrates that no court has ad-
dressed the issue adequately and proposes two judicial solutions 8 which
12. See Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, No. 92-3009 (D.S.D. Jan. 8, 1993); Semi-
nole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 801 F. Supp. 655 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
13. For purposes of this Note, the phrases "all eight courts" or "the eight cases" refer to the
following decisions: Pueblo of Sandia v. New Mexico, No. 92-0613 JC (D.N.M. Nov. 13, 1992);
Ponca Tribe of Oklahoma v. Oklahoma, No. 92-988-T (2 W.D. Okla. Sept. 8, 1992); Sault Ste.
Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Michigan, 800 F. Supp. 1484 (W.D. Mich. 1992); Poarch Band
of Creek Indians v. Alabama, 776 F. Supp. 550 (S.D. Ala. 1991); Mississippi Band of Choctaw
Indians v. Mississippi, No. CIV.A.J90-0386(B), 1991 WL 255614 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 9, 1991); Spokane
Tribe of Indians v. Washington, 790 F. Supp. 1057 (E.D. Wash. 1991). Contra Cheyenne River
Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, No. 92-3009 (D.S.D. Jan. 8, 1993) (holding that states may not assert
sovereign immunity defense to IGRA); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 801 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.
Fla. 1992) (same).
14. Both the "Interstate Commerce Clause" and "Indian Commerce Clause" are included in
Article One, Section Eight, Clause Three of the Constitution. Clause Three provides that Congress
has the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian tribes .... U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
15. 801 F. Supp. 655 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
16. No. 92-3009 (D.S.D. Jan. 8, 1993).
17. The term "Eleventh Amendment-Indian gaming cases" will be used in this Note to identify
the class III Indian gaming cases in which states have asserted an Eleventh Amendment defense.
See supra note 13.
18. The scope of this Note is limited to judicial proposals for remedying the current tribal-state
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recognize that IGRA legitimately requires the states to submit to federal
jurisdiction on class III gaming issues.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Rise of Indian Gaming Before IGRA
Games of chance have been a traditional part of Indian culture. 9 In
recent years, tribes have been faced with severe economic problems,
20
conflicts in class III gaming. Legislative solutions are also possible. In the 102nd Congress, Repre-
sentative Esteban Torres sponsored a bill that would have removed the compacting privilege from
states refusing to negotiate with tribes. The bill, which was not passed, would have eliminated the
Eleventh Amendment problem-if a state refused to negotiate, the state's authority to conclude a
tribal-state compact would be removed and transferred to the National Indian Gaming Commission.
The Commission was established under 25 U.S.C. § 2704 as a subdivision of the Department of the
Interior to monitor class II and class III gaming. The bill provided, in pertinent part, as follows:
[Create a new section, 25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(8) to read:]
(a) An Indian Tribe may conduct Class III Gaming pursuant to a Class III Gaming Cer-
tificate issued by the Commission under § 2710(d)(10).
(b) A tribe may apply for a Class III Gaming Certificate under § 2710(d)(10) only if:
(i) a state fails to consent to the jurisdiction of the federal court pursuant to
§ 2710(d)(7)(A)(i) within 180 days of the delivery to the state of a request by a tribe for
compact negotiations as provided for by § 2710(d)(3)(A), whichever is longer,
(ii) in an action brought against a state by a tribe, a state raises any defense to the jurisdic-
tion of the federal court on any grounds which are not curable by the tribal plaintiff, or
(iii) the federal court finds it lacks jurisdiction for any reason not curable by the tribe.
H.R. REP. No. 6158, 102nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
Senator Daniel Inouye has also been frustrated with the states' refusal to cooperate in the com-
pacting process. At a National Tribal Leaders Forum meeting, he commented:
Federal law has clearly authorized the operation of gaming activities on Indian land. I will
not stand by and allow states to put padlocks on the doors of Indian gaming establish-
ments. That is not fair.... This tribal-state compact idea was not your idea, it was not my
idea, it was a concept that was proposed and supported by the several states of this
Union.... It appears to me that some states are telling Congress: We don't want to have
anything to do with Indian gaming. We won't even enter compacts. We won't let you
bring us into court and tell us whether we should negotiate or not. This a law they wanted,
and now they say forget it.
So, I say, very simply: If the states don't want a role to play, that's OK with me.... If
the federal government enters into a compact with a tribal government, there will be no
state regulation or enforcement....
Chet Lunner, Inouye Threatens to Remove State Control of Indian Gaming, GANNETT NEWS SER-
VICE, May 13, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File.
Legislative proposals that remove all state authority in the compacting process are theoretically
possible, but are not politically feasible because of the states' opposition to any form of Indian gam-
ing. See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
19. See, eg., WILLIAM BRANDON, INDIANS 42, 136 (1987); DOLAN H. EAGLE, JR., THE
EARTH IS OUR MOTHER: A GUIDE TO THE INDIANS OF CALIFORNIA, THEIR LOCALES AND HIS-
TORIC SITES 38, 38-39, 90 (1986); RALPH ANDREWS, INDIAN PRIMITIVE 59-61 (1960).
20. Tribes typically have unemployment rates that range from 50 to 90 percent. 134 CONG.
REc. 8,156 (1988) (statement of Rep. Sikorski). See also 134 CONG. REC. 24,027-28 (1988) (state-
ments of Sens. Evans and Domenici).
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and as a result, many tribes have turned to gaming as their primary
source of income.21
The roots of the controversy over Indian gaming can be traced to the
Fifth Circuit's decision in Seminole Tribe v. Butterworth.22 In 1979 the
Seminole Tribe was the first tribe to begin a major bingo operation on a
reservation.23 In Butterworth, the Fifth Circuit upheld a federal district
court ruling that the Seminole Tribe of Florida could continue its bingo
operations despite the State of Florida's opposition.24 The court of ap-
peals decided that the tribe could conduct gaming without state interfer-
ence because the federal government had never transferred jurisdiction to
the State of Florida to impose its civil regulatory laws on Indian lands.25
Indeed, states generally do not have jurisdiction over Indian lands un-
less Congress specifically grants such jurisdiction.26  Accordingly, the
State in Butterworth asserted that Congress had granted such jurisdiction
over the Tribe's bingo operation through Public Law 83-280.27 Public
21. In some cases, gaming has become the only option for tribal economic development. See
134 CONG. REc. 24,026 (1988) (statement of Sen. McCain). However, neither Indian tribes nor
Congress intend gaming to become a permanent foundation for tribal economies. Rather, Indian
leaders and members of Congress see gaming as a necessary first step toward long-term economic
development. See, e.g., Diane Brooks, Tulalip Casino is a Gamble that Paid Off-Tribe Discovers
Surprise Windfall in Profit Margins and Self-Esteem, SEATrLE TIMES, December 11, 1992, at C4
(relating that Charles Keechi, Chairman of the National Indian Gaming Association stated, "'I
don't think gambling is going to be the end result of economic development, but (rather) a stepping
stone to something else.' "); 134 CONG. Rac. 24,028 (1988) (statement of Sen. Domenici) ("I hope
in 10 years we could look back and say we had to do this because our Indian people had such
difficulty in getting economic opportunity to their people that they had to look to gambling. I hope
we will be able to look back in 10 years and say this was just part of a whole series of economic
opportunities for our Indian people.").
22. 658 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981). Robert Butterworth was the Sheriff of Broward
County, Florida who informed the Tribe that it was violating state law. Id. at 311.
23. S. REP. NO. 446, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071,
3072 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT No. 446].
24. Butterworth, 658 F.2d at 312.
25. Id. at 312-15.
26. Id. at 312. Because tribes are sovereign entities, states have historically had few rights to
impose regulations on Indian tribes. The Supreme Court recognized this fact in one of its earliest
Indian law cases, Worchester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). Chief Justice Marshall
explained:
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with
boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and
which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees
themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with acts of congress.
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561. See infra note 74 for a discussion of the unique relationship between the
federal government and Indian tribes.
27. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, § 7, 67 Stat. 590 (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1984) and 28
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Law 83-280 gave states the power to transfer criminal jurisdiction over
Indians and Indian lands from the federal government to the state.28 Ad-
ditionally, Florida argued that it could prohibit the Tribe from operating
bingo halls by virtue of the state's statute on bingo operations.29
The court first noted that the Supreme Court had decided that Public
Law 83-280 does not grant the states general civil regulatory authority
over Indian tribes.30 The court reasoned that in order to prevail, Florida
needed to show that bingo was prohibited by criminal sanctions rather
than merely regulated by civil ordinances." The court ultimately con-
cluded that Florida's policy toward bingo was more civil-regulatory than
criminal-prohibitory a2 because Florida did not prohibit all bingo activi-
ties.3" Therefore, the state could not assert its jurisdiction over the
Tribe's bingo operation through Public Law 83-280. 34
U.S.C. § 1360 (1976)), repealed by Act of April 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 403(b), 82 Stat. 79
(1984).
28. S. REP. No. 446 succinctly summarizes the intent of Public Law 83-280:
Public Law 83-280, codified in 18 U.S.C. 1162 and 28 U.S.C. 1360, authorized the transfer
of criminal jurisdiction over Indians and Indian lands from the Federal Government to
those state governments that chose to assert such jurisdiction. Tribes were free to continue
to exercise civil jurisdiction over their members and their lands. The law was subsequently
amended in 1968 to require tribal consent before jurisdiction could be transferred to a
State. Since then, no tribes have done so and no new states are permitted to come under
the Public Law 280 statute.
S. REP. No. 446, at 3072 n.I.
Florida was a "280 state." 658 F.2d at 311. Florida assumed criminal jurisdiction over Indian
reservations under Public Law 83-280 before 1968, when the law was amended to require the tribes'
consent.
29. Butterworth, 658 F.2d at 311-12.
30. Id at 313. The court referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Bryan v. Itasca County,
426 U.S. 373 (1976). In Bryan, the Court held that Public Law 83-280 granted civil jurisdiction to
the states only to the extent necessary to resolve private disputes between Indians and private citi-
zens. Bryan, 426 U.S. at 383. The Bryan Court stated: "if Congress in enacting Pub. L. 280 had
intended to confer upon the States general civil regulatory powers, including taxation over reserva-
tion Indians, it would have expressly said so." Id. at 390. The court in Butterworth concluded "[lI]t
is clear that these same limitations on civil jurisdiction would apply to a state that assumed jurisdic-
tion pursuant to... Public Law 280. Thus the mandate from the Supreme Court is that states do
not have general regulatory power over the Indian tribes." 658 F.2d at 313.
31. Butterworth, 658 F.2d at 313.
32. Id at 315-16. In dictum, the court stated that Florida's bingo statute could arguably be
construed as criminal-prohibitory. However, citing the rule in Bryan the court noted that in cases of
doubtful statutory construction, a statute should be construed in favor of the Indians. Butterworth,
658 F.2d at 316. For a more complete discussion of this liberal construction rule, see infra notes
218-22 and accompanying text.
33. Id at 314. The court noted that Florida's bingo statute allowed charitable organizations to
conduct bingo games.
34. Id at 315-16.
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After Butterworth, Indian bingo operations proliferated,35 as did the
states' opposition to them.36 In the case that was the landmark for In-
dian gaming, California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians,37 the
Supreme Court recognized the right of Indian tribes to conduct gaming
without state interference. 38
California, like Florida, was a "280 state," meaning that it had unilat-
erally elected to assume criminal jurisdiction over Indian reservations
under Public Law 83-280 before the law was amended to require the
tribes' consent.39 California therefore threatened to apply criminal sanc-
tions against the Cabazon and Morongo Bands of Mission Indians when
they opened a bingo hall and card hall at which casino-type card games
were played.' The tribes sought a declaratory judgment that California
had no power to apply its statutes on the reservation, and the district
court granted the tribes' motion for summary judgment.41 The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision42 as did the Supreme
Court.4 3
Although consistent with Butterworth,' the Cabazon decision is even
more important because the Supreme Court allowed tribes to conduct
casino-style gaming as well as bingo.45 The Court rejected California's
argument that its bingo statute was a criminal law.46 Instead, the Court
found that California not only permitted a substantial amount of gam-
bling, but also that the state had actually promoted gambling on one
35. Over 100 tribal bingo games opened between the date of the Butterworth decision and 1988.
S. REP. No. 446, at 3072.
36. See, eg., California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987); Gary Soko-
low, The Future of Gambling in Indian Country, 15 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 151, 166-67 (1990);
Thomas L. Wilson, Indian Gaming and Economic Development on the Reservation, 68 MICH. BAR J.
380, 381-82 (1989); Nancy McKay, Comment, The Meaning of Good Faith in the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act, 27 GONZ. L. REv. 471 (1991-92).
37. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
38. Id. at 211.
39. Id. at 207. See supra note 28 for an explanation of the jurisdictional effects of Public Law
83-280.
40. Id. at 204-05.
41. Id. at 206. The district court held that the state did not have any authority to enforce its
gambling laws within the reservations. Id
42. Id.
43. Id at 222.
44. In Cabazon, the Court affirmed the application of the civil-regulatory versus criminal-pro-
hibitory test used in Butterworth. Id. at 209-11.
45. Id. at 210-14.
46. Id at 207-12.
Washington University Open Scholarship
742 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 71:735
occasion.4 7 Therefore, the majority decided that California regulated,
rather than prohibited, gambling,4" and prevented the state from assert-
ing its jurisdiction over the tribes' gaming activities.49
Perhaps the most important aspect of Cabazon is the Court's discus-
sion of the numerous and conflicting interests involved in Indian gam-
ing.50 This discussion provided the focus for Congress' attempt to enact
legislation that would balance the interests of the three major players in
Indian gaming: the federal government, the tribes, and the states.5 '
The Supreme Court's decision in Cabazon essentially rested on balanc-
ing state interests against federal and tribal interests.52 Although the
tribes argued in favor of a per se rule that would forbid state jurisdiction
over tribes in the absence of expressed congressional consent, 53 the Court
ruled that in certain circumstances, state laws may be applied to tribal
members on reservations, even if not expressly authorized by Congress. 54
47. Id. at 210. California permitted parimutuel horse-race betting. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§§ 19400-19667 (West 1964 and Supp. 1987). Bingo was also allowed. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 211.
California promoted its state-run lottery through advertising. Cabazon, at 210-11. CAL. GOVT.
CODE ANN § 880 (West Supp. 1987).
48. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 211. One author has suggested that the Court's method in deciding
that California's approach to gambling was civil-regulatory rather than criminal-prohibitory is quite
significant. "Cabazon seemed to indicate that if a state allowed some types of gaming activities, the
state's approach to 'gambling in general' would be interpreted to be civil-regulatory. Under this
construction, the limit to Indian gaming operations was difficult to determine." Eric J. Swanson,
Note, The Reservation Gaming Craze: Casino Gambling Under the Indian Gaming and Regulatory
Act of 1988, 15 HAMLINE L. REv. 471, 474 (1992).
49. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 211-214.
50. Id. at 214-22. See also infra notes 52-64 and accompanying text.
51. Congress discussed the importance of the Cabazon decision during the floor debate on
IGRA. 134 CONG. REc. 24,027 (statement of Sen. Evans) ("This law should be considered within
the line of developed case law extending over a century and a half by the Supreme Court, including
the basic principles set forth in the Cabazon decision."). See also S. REP. No. 446, at 3072.
52. Cabazon, 480 U.S. 214-22.
53. Id. at 214. Referring to a statement in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411
U.S. 164, 170-71 (1973), the Tribes argued that the Supreme Court should simply affirm the deci-
sions of the lower courts with nothing more, because the state laws at issue were imposed directly on
the Tribes without the expressed consent of Congress. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 214.
54. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 214-16. The majority noted that, except for the area of state taxation
of tribes, the Supreme Court had not previously adopted "an inflexible per se rule precluding state
jurisdiction ... in the absence of express congressional consent." Id. at 214-15 (footnote omitted).
The Court cited to the general rule in New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 331-32
(1983), that states may assert jurisdiction over tribal members on reservations under exceptional
circumstances. Next, the Court provided two illustrative cases on this rule, Moe v. Confederated
Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976), and Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville
Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980). In both decisions, the Supreme Court held that the state
had a significant interest in requiring tribal smokeshops to collect state sales tax from non-Indian
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The Court then applied a balancing test to determine whether Califor-
nia's laws could be applied to the on-reservation gaming activities of the
tribal members." The Court analyzed the federal and tribal interests. 5 6
The federal government's interests in fulfilling its trust obligations57 to
Indian tribes were extremely strong in the area of Indian gaming. 8 In
fact, several federal agencies financed, developed, approved, and re-
viewed tribal gaming organizations.59 This federal assistance to tribal
gaming enterprises furthered the federal policy of encouraging tribal self-
government and economic development.' The Tribes, too, were inter-
ested in self-government and economic development. The majority in
Cabazon believed that the Tribes' interest was especially strong because
gaming represented the sole source of revenue for tribal governments and
the provision of tribal services. 61
In comparison, the Court found that the State's asserted interest in
preventing the infiltration of organized crime into tribal gaming opera-
tions was considerably weaker.62 The Court considered the State's as-
serted interest in prohibiting all tribal games irrelevant because the State
permitted considerable off-reservation gaming.63 The Court then con-
customers. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 216. The tribes' burden in collecting the tax was minimal while the
states' interests in collecting sales tax from non-Indians was significant. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 215-
16. Finally, the Court determined that this was an appropriate case to apply the state versus fed-
eral/tribal interests test because "the question is whether the State may prevent the Tribes from
making available high stakes bingo games to non-Indians coming from outside the reservations."
Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 216.
55. See supra note 48.
56. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 217-22.
57. See infra note 74 for a concise explanation of Congress' trust obligation to Indian tribes.
For a more complete history of the relationship between the federal government and Indian tribes,
see generally FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (1986 ed.).
58. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 217. The Court noted that the court of appeals had relied on official
declarations by the Assistant Secretary of the Interior and the Director of Indian Services, Bureau of
Indian Affairs. 783 F.2d at 904-905. Both the Assistant Secretary of the Interior and the Director of
Indian Services strongly supported tribal gaming and opposed legislation that would limit this poten-
tial revenue source. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 217-18 n.21.
59. These agencies included the Interior Department, the Department of Housing and Urban
Development, and the Department of Health and Human Services. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 217-18.
60. Id. at 218-19.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 220-22. The Court also rejected California's attempt to diminish the importance of
the Tribal interests. Whereas the State contended that the Tribes were "merely marketing an exemp-
tion from state gambling laws," the Court asserted that the Tribes were "generating value on the
reservations through activities in which they have a substantial interest." Id. at 219-20.
63. Id. at 220-21. The Court partially accepted the State's argument that the high stakes of-
fered at the Tribal games would be more attractive to organized crime than the regulated gaming
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cluded that because the federal and tribal interests outweighed the State's
interests, California could not regulate the Tribes' bingo and casino-style
card gaming operations. 6
B. IGRA: Legislative History and Key Provisions
Although IGRA was not enacted until 1988,65 the Act is the product
of years of congressional efforts to devise a comprehensive scheme for
regulating gaming activities on Indian lands.66 The Act attempts to bal-
ance the competing interests of the tribes, federal government, and states,
just as the Supreme Court had tried to do in Cabazon .67
Tribes have several obvious interests in gaming operations. Gaming
operations can be opened quickly with minimal capital expenditures.68
Additionally, gambling enterprises often serve as the main source of tri-
bal revenue, other than funding from the federal government.69 In turn,
these revenues enable the tribes to gain greater economic and political
self-sufficiency.70 The tribes' primary concerns regarding gaming relate
to attempts by the states to interfere with tribal sovereignty. 1
authorized under California law. However, the Court maintained that this legitimate concern did
not preempt the weightier federal and tribal interests. Id. at 221.
64. Id. at 221-22.
65. See supra note 2.
66. See generally Sokolow, supra note 36 (comprehensive discussion of proposed legislation
during the 98th, 99th, and 100th Congresses, before the passage of IGRA).
67. S. REP. No. 446. See also supra notes 52-64 and accompanying text.
68. The explosion of Indian gaming is evidence of the benefits of the low capital expenditures
required to start an operation. See supra note 4. The Tulalip Tribe's Casino provides a specific
example. Although the Casino opened in the middle of 1992, revenues escalated so much that the
Tribes could repay the $2.5 million construction loan by the end of the Casino's first year. Brooks,
supra note 21, at C4.
69. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
70. For an example of economic self-sufficiency, see Brooks, supra note 21, at C4. Brooks
suggests:
For the Tulalips, casino income already has helped build a new dental clinic and hire a
dentist to staff it. Early next year, the tribes hope to break ground for a new community
center for tribal elders. In addition, matching funds are needed for a federal Housing and
Urban Development grant to build a recovery home for tribal members fighting drug or
alcohol problems.
See also supra note 4.
For an example of political self-sufficiency, see Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 218-19 (stating that gaming
revenues were the sole source of income for the operation of the tribal government). See also
Stanich, supra note 4, at A16 (gaming revenues support the infrastructure of tribal government).
71. Many tribes were opposed to IGRA because it gave the state a considerable role in more
sophisticated gambling activities. See, eg., Ken Miller, Suits, Seizures Possible With Indian Gam-
bling Rules, GANNETr NEWS SERVICE, May 6, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis, Currnt File (re-
porting that Senator Daniel Inouye said that when IGRA was enacted in 1988, tribes opposed it
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In most respects, the federal interests in gaming parallel those of the
tribes.72 Both the executive and the legislative branches also view gam-
ing as a means to promote strong tribal governments and economic self-
sufficiency.73 Thus, the federal government is able to fulfill its trust obli-
gation to the tribes74 by defending their rights to operate gambling enter-
while states supported it). See also 134 CONG. REc. 24,024 (1988) (statement of Sen. Evans) (ac-
knowledging that many tribes opposed IGRA because of the potential for extending state jurisdic-
tion over Indian lands for certain gaming activities); Wilson, supra note 36, at 384 (citing Red Lake
Band of Chippewa Indians and Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Swimmer, 740 F. Supp. 9 (D.D.C. 1990),
in which two tribes asserted that IGRA interferes with tribal sovereignty and self-government).
72. See, eg., Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 202 (deciding that the interests in tribal self-determination
and economic development are common to the federal government and to the tribes).
73. Both the President and various officials of the executive branch have promoted Indian gam-
ing. See, e.g., Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 217-18 (The President of the United States, Secretary of the
Interior, Department of Housing and Urban Development, and the Department of Health and
Human Services favor Indian gaming).
Congress also sees gaming as a means of promoting strong tribal governments and economic self-
sufficiency. See, eg., supra note 3 and accompanying text.
74. In early decisions, the Supreme Court noted the unique relationship between the federal
government and the Indian tribes. Essentially, Congress has a dual, if somewhat contradictory, role
with respect to the Indian tribes. On one hand, Congress has almost unlimited "plenary" power
over the tribes. One scholar has succinctly described this authority: "[w]hat Congress wants, Con-
gress gets." Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power Over Indians" Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations,
132 U. PA. L. REv. 195, 285 (1984). In United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886), the Supreme
Court explicitly recognized the plenary power doctrine:
It seems to us that this [authority to enact a federal criminal statute regarding certain acts
of tribal Indians within a reservation] is within the competency of Congress. These Indian
tribes are wards of the nation. They are communities dependent on the United States.
Dependent largely for their daily food. Dependent for their political rights. They owe no
allegiance to the States, and receive from them no protection. Because of the local ill
feeling, the people of the States where they are found are often their deadliest enemies.
From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the
Federal Government with them and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arises
the duty of protection, and with it the power.
Id. at 383-84.
There is some ambiguity as to the origin of Congress' plenary power over Indian tribes. Felix
Cohen suggested the origins were constitutional sources, such as the Indian Commerce Clause and
Congress' appropriating and treaty-making powers. See COHEN, supra note 57, at 89-91. Cohen
noted, however, that the plenary power doctrine actually extends beyond constitutional sources:
While the decisions of the courts may be explained on the basis of express constitutional
powers, the language used in some cases seems to indicate that decisions were influenced by
a consideration of the peculiar relationship between the Indians and the Federal Govern-
ment [citing Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903); Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock,
187 U.S. 294 (1902); and Brader v. James, 246 U.S. 88 (1918), among other sources].
Thus in United States v. Kagama, the Supreme Court found that the protection of the
Indians constituted a national problem and referred to the practical necessity of protecting
the Indians and the nonexistence of such a power in the states.
COHEN, supra note 57, at 90 (emphasis added).
Notice that in the above quotation from Kagama, the Court not only recognized the legitimacy of
Congress' plenary power, but also stated, "[Tihere arises the duty of protection ...." Kagama, 118
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prises and simultaneously protect the government's economic interest by
decreasing the degree to which Indian tribes depend on the federal gov-
ernment for funding.7 5 Federal and tribal interests may clash, however,
in the area of regulation. While the tribes seek to regulate their gaming
establishments with little outside interference,7 6 the federal government
desires federal and state regulation, in addition to tribal regulation, to
prevent organized crime from infiltrating tribal gambling."
U.S. at 384. This duty of protection owed by the federal government to the Indian tribes is often
referred to as Congress' "trust obligation." Chief Justice Marshall was the first to describe this trust
relationship between the United States and Indian tribes in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5
Pet.) 1 (1831):
They [the Indian tribes] may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic depen-
dent nations.... Their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guard-
ian.
They look to our government for protection; rely upon its kindness and its power; appeal
to it for relief to their wants; and address the president as their great father. They and their
country are considered by foreign nations, as well as by ourselves, as being so completely
under the sovereignty and dominion of the United States, that any attempt to acquire their
lands, or to form a political connection with them, would be considered by all as an inva-
sion of our territory, and an act of hostility.
Id. at 17.
See also Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) (acknowledging that because of the govern-
ment's trust obligation, Congress can enact legislation that singles out Indians for preferential treat-
ment); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974) (highlighting the federal government's responsibility to
deal fairly with all Indians, regardless of whether tribal members reside on a reservation or outside
the reservation); Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286 (1942) (holding that the federal
government has a trust obligation to make amends for violations of an 1856 treaty).
In sum, "[a] relationship of dependence and trust not only gives the federal government broad,
plenary powers over Indian affairs, but also imposes a trustee's duties of protection and fair dealings
upon the government." DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, CASES AND MATERI-
ALS 37 (2d ed. 1986). Cases such as Cabazon and the Eleventh Amendment-Indian gaming cases
demonstrate that both doctrines--Congress' plenary power and trust obligation-maintain their vi-
tality today in the context of Indian affairs.
75. The President's 1983 Statement on Indian Policy reads: "It is important to the concept of
self-government that tribes reduce their dependence on Federal funds by providing a greater percent-
age of the cost of their self-government." 19 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 99 (1983)(cited in Cabazon,
480 U.S. at 217 n.20).
76. See, eg., Wilson, supra note 36, at 383:
Indian tribes have long resented references to their gaming enterprises as 'unregulated
gambling.' ... Tribal games are usually referred to as unregulated gambling because they
are not being regulated by the non-Indian world. This is seen as an implied denial of the
right of Indian governments to be self-governing and to continue such activity. Early on,
Indians were concerned that unregulated gaming might lead to undesirable conduct, and
thus enacted tribal laws to control and regulate tribal games.
77. See S. Rep. No. 446. See also S. REP. No. 446, at 3092 (relating letter from the U.S.
Department of Justice giving the Administration's view that federal control over high-stakes gam-
bling is too weak in the proposed legislation).
At least two authors believe that organized crime has already infiltrated some Indian gambling
enterprises. See Swanson, supra note 48, at 491-93; Jonathon Littman, And the Dealer Stays: Indian
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol71/iss3/6
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State interests are more directly opposed to tribal interests. The states,
like the federal government, insist that they must regulate sophisticated
gambling to guard against organized crime.7 8 The dominant state inter-
est, however, is an economic one. The states fear that Indian gaming will
compete with other gaming institutions within the states.79 Unlike other
gambling enterprises, states cannot operate gambling projects on the res-
ervations or collect taxes from the revenues generated by tribal gambling
operations.80
The most controversial provisions of IGRA are those that attempt to
balance the competing tribal, federal, and state interests. Controversy
Gaming is a 1990s Gold Rush with Lawyers Leading the Charge, CAL. LAWYER, Jan. 1993, at 45
(illustrating that there is strong evidence of organized crime, including an execution-style murder, on
the Reservation of the Cabazon Band of Mission Indians).
78. See, eg., Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 220.
79. See, eg., S. REP. No. 446. Senator John McCain noted:
As the debate unfolded, it became clear that the interests of the states and of the gaming
industry extended far beyond their expressed concern about organized crime. Their true
interest was protection of their own games from a new source of economic competition....
Never mind the fact that in 15 years of gaming activity on Indian reservations there has
never been one clearly proven case of organized criminal activity. In spite of these and
other reasons, the State and gaming industry have always come to the table with the posi-
tion that what is theirs is theirs and what the Tribes have is negotiable.
S. REP. No. 446, at 3071, 3103.
Similarly, Senator Daniel Evans stated:
We should be candid about gambling. This issue is not one of crime control, morality, or
economic fairness. ... Ironically, the strongest opponents of tribal authority over gaming
on Indian lands are from States whose liberal gaming policies would allow them to com-
pete on an equal basis with the tribes.
S. REP. No. 446, at 3071, 3105.
80. The Supreme Court has consistently held that the states have no authority to tax Indian
tribes. In Cabazon, the Court summarized its decisions in this area:
In the special area of state taxation of Indian tribes and tribal members, we have adopted a
perse rule [to preclude state taxation of Indian tribes]. In Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471
U.S. 759 (1985), we held that Montana could not tax the Tribe's royalty interests in oil and
gas leases issued to non-Indian lessees under the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938....
We have repeatedly addressed the issue of state taxation of tribes and tribal members and
the state, federal, and tribal interests which it implicates. We have recognized that the
federal tradition of Indian immunity from state taxation is very strong and that the state
interest in taxation is correspondingly weak. Accordingly, it is unnecessary to rebalance
these interests in every case. In Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148
(1973), we distinguished state taxation from other assertions of state jurisdiction. We ac-
knowledged "in the special area of state taxation, absent cession of jurisdiction or other
federal statutes permitting it, there has been no satisfactory authority for taxing Indian
reservation lands or Indian income from activities carried on within the boundaries of the
reservation, and McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, [411 U.S. 164 (1973)], lays to
rest any doubt in this respect by holding that such taxation is not permissible absent con-
gressional consent."
Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 215-16 n.17 (alterations in original).
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surrounds the classification system,"1 the compacting process,8 2 and the
jurisdictional provision. 3
Under IGRA, there are three classes of Indian gaming. Class I activi-
ties,84 traditional Indian games, present few problems. There is no tribal-
state conflict over these activities because tribes exercise exclusive juris-
diction over class I gaming on Indian lands.8 5
More sophisticated class II activities86 are allowed on Indian lands
only if the lands are in a state that permits such gaming by any person or
organization. 7 Tribes regulate class II activities with oversight by the
National Indian Gaming Commission. 8
Although there has been considerable litigation involving class II ac-
tivities, 9 high-stakes class III activities90 have generated the most con-
81. IGRA divides Indian gaming activities into three categories: class I, class II, and class III.
25 U.S.C. § 2710 (1988). See also supra note 8 (defining class III gaming).
82. See supra note 7 and infra note 92.
83. Section 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7) provides:
(7)(A) the United States district courts shall have jurisdiction over-
(i) any cause of action initiated by an Indian tribe arising from the failure of a State to
enter into negotiations with the Indian tribe for the purpose of entering into a Tribal-State
compact under paragraph (3) or to conduct such negotiations in good faith,
(ii) any cause of action initiated by a State or Indian tribe to enjoin a class III gaming
activity located on Indian lands and conducted in violation of any Tribal-State compact
entered into under paragraph (3) that is in effect, and
(iii) any cause of action initiated by the Secretary [of the Interior] to enforce the proce-
dures prescribed under subparagraph (B)(vii).
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A) (1988).
84. "The term 'class I gaming' means social games solely for prizes of minimal value or tradi-
tional forms of Indian gaming engaged in by individuals as a part of, or in connection with, tribal
ceremonies or celebrations." 25 U.S.C. § 2703(6) (1988).
85. Id. § 2710(a).
86. Class II gaming is defined as "the games of chance commonly known as bingo.., including
... pull-tabs, lotto, punch boards, tip jars, instant bingo, and other games similar to bingo, and card
games.... ." Id. § 2703(7)(A)(i)&(ii).
87. Id. § 2710(b)(1).
88. Id. § 2706(b)(1). The National Indian Gaming Commission, a subdivision of the Depart-
ment of the Interior, was established under IGRA to regulate and oversee Indian gaming operations.
Id. § 2704.
89. The most common issue in class II cases has been whether an activity should be character-
ized as class II or class III. The tribes seek to have the disputed activity characterized as class II so
that the state cannot play a regulatory role. The states, however, want contested activities to be
classified as class III. Because class III activities require a tribal-state compact, see supra note 7,
states can exercise much more control over gaming on Indian lands. See, eg., Oneida Tribe of
Indians of Wisconsin v. Wisconsin, 951 F.2d 757 (7th Cir. 1991); Spokane Tribe of Indians v. United
States, 782 F. Supp. 520 (E.D. Wash. 1991) (demonstrating how tribes contend that proposed activi-
ties are class II while states insist that these activities are class III).
90. Class III activities include the most sophisticated forms of gambling such as casino games
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flict between tribes and states. According to IGRA, class III activities
are permissible on Indian lands only if: (1) the lands are located within a
state that permits gambling for any purpose by any person or organiza-
tion; (2) the tribe adopts a gaming ordinance that has been approved by
the Chairman of the National Indian Gaming Commission; and (3) the
activities are conducted in conformity with a tribal-state compact.91
Under section 2710(d)(3) of the Act, the compact governs the manner in
which class III activities will be organized within a particular Indian
reservation. 92
IGRA's jurisdictional provision, section 2710(d)(7), is related to the
classification system and the compacting process. Under this section, the
federal district courts have jurisdiction over class III controversies that
arise between tribes and states.93 Section 2710(d)(7) is the root of most
tribal-state disputes over high-stakes gambling. Until recently, there
were few class III cases, and all of them had been decided in favor of the
tribes and against the states.94 However, in 1991, states began adopting a
new strategy-asserting an Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity
and jai-alai. See supra note 8. Class III encompasses all types of gaming that are not included in
class I or class II. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(8) (1988).
91. Id. § 2710(d)(1).
92. The provisions state:
(3)(A) Any Indian tribe having jurisdiction over Indian lands upon which a class III
gaming activity is being conducted, or is to be conducted, shall request the State in which
such lands are located to enter into negotiations for the purpose of entering into a Tribal-
State compact governing the conduct of gaming activities. Upon receiving such a request,
the State shall negotiate with the Indian tribe in good faith to enter into such a com-
pact....
(C) Any Tribal-State compact negotiated under subparagraph (A) may include provi-
sions relating to-
(i) the application of the criminal and civil laws and regulations of the Indian tribe or
the State that are directly related to, and necessary for, the licensing and regulation of such
activity;
(ii) the allocation of criminal and civil jurisdiction between the State and the Indian
tribe necessary for the enforcement of such laws and regulations;
(iii) the assessment by the State of such activities in such amounts as are necessary to
defray the costs of regulating such activity;
(iv) taxation by the Indian tribe of such activity in amounts comparable to amounts
assessed by the State for comparable activities;
(v) remedies for breach of contract;
(vi) standards for the operation of such activity and maintenance of the gaming facility,
including licensing; and
(vii) any other subjects that are directly related to the operation of gaming activities.
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A) & (C) (1988).
93. For the text of § 2710(d)(7), see supra note 83.
94. Until recently, the main issue in most conflicts over class III activities had been whether a
state was negotiating in good faith with an Indian tribe to adopt a tribal-state compact. See, eg.,
Mashantucket Pequot Indians v. Connecticut, 913 F.2d 1024 (2d. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct.
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defense to the jurisdictional provision of IGRA. To date, this strategy
has been quite successful.95
II. EARLY SUCCESSES FOR THE TRIBES
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Mashantucket Pe-
quot Tribe v. Connecticut96 provides a good example of the Indian tribes'
early success in establishing high-stakes gambling operations. In
Mashantucket, the Second Circuit affirmed a district court decision that
required the state to conclude a tribal-state compact for class III gaming
within sixty days, as provided in IGRA.97 The state advanced three ar-
guments: (1) as a precondition to entering negotiations under IGRA, the
tribe must first adopt a tribal ordinance authorizing casino-type gambling
on the reservation;98 (2) the type of class III gaming the Tribe sought to
establish was not the type of gaming permitted in Connecticut; 99 and (3)
under IGRA, the district court is required to order the State and Tribe to
conclude a compact only when the court finds that the state failed to
negotiate in good faith, and because the State did not negotiate at all, the
court cannot order the State to conclude a compact with the Tribe. "
The Second Circuit rejected all three arguments. In response to the
State's first assertion, the court held that IGRA only required that a tribe
668 (1991); Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 770 F. Supp.
480 (W.D. Wis. 1991), aff'd, 957 F.2d 515 (7th Cir. 1992).
95. See supra note 13 for several cases in which states successfully raised Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity defenses.
96. 913 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 668 (1991).
97. Id. at 1025. The relevant IGRA section provides:
(i) An Indian tribe may initiate a cause of action described in subparagraph (A)(i) only
after the close of the 180-day period beginning on the date on which the Indian tribe re-
quested the State to enter into negotiations....
(ii) In any action described in subparagraph (A)(i), upon the introduction of evidence by
an Indian tribe that-
(I) a Tribal-State compact has not been entered into...
(II) the State did not respond to the request of the Indian tribe to negotiate such a
compact or did not respond to such request in good faith, the burden of proof shall be upon
the State to prove that the State has negotiated with the Indian tribe in good faith to
conclude a Tribal-State compact governing the conduct of gaming activities.
(iii) If... the court finds that the State has failed to negotiate in good faith with the
Indian tribe to conclude a Tribal-State compact governing the conduct of gaming activities,
the court shall order the State and the Indian Tribe to conclude such a compact within a 60-
day period.
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B) (1988) (emphasis added).
98. Mashantucket, 913 F.2d at 1028.
99. Id. at 1029.
100. Id. at 1032.
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request to negotiate with a state as a prerequisite to negotiating a tribal-
state compact. 10 1 The court found that a tribe must adopt an appropriate
tribal ordinance before engaging in class III gaming, but said that noth-
ing suggests that the tribal ordinance must be enacted before a state must
negotiate.102
The court responded to the State's second argument by referring to the
statutory language of section 2701(5), which declares that Indian tribes
may regulate gaming on Indian lands if the gaming is "conducted within
a State which does not, as a matter of criminal law and public policy,
prohibit such gaming activity." 103 The Second Circuit noted that Con-
necticut only regulated gaming and did not prohibit it outright.1°4
Therefore, even if the State did not permit the specific casino-style gam-
ing that the Tribe planned to conduct," 5 the Tribe should be able to
operate its gambling activity because the State merely regulated other
gambling activities." 6
Finally, in response to the State's third argument, the court held that
the trial court had made no express finding as to the State's lack of good
faith because the State did not raise the issue. 107 Nevertheless, the court
had the authority under IGRA to order the State to conclude a compact
with the Tribe.108 The court determined that section 2710(d)(7)(B)(ii) of
IGRA vests jurisdiction in district courts if a state does not negotiate in
101. Id. at 1028.
102. Mashantucket, 913 F.2d at 1028. The court explained:
Section 2710(d)(1) on its face lists several conditions that must be satisfied before a tribe
can lawfully engage in class III gaming. Although the adoption of an appropriate tribal
ordinance is the first requirement set forth in section 2710(d)(1), nothing in that provision
requires sequential satisfaction of its requirements, nor does its legislative history suggest
that a tribal ordinance must be in place before a state's obligation to negotiate arises.
Id.
103. Id. at 1029. The court noted that § 2701(5) is consistent with the Supreme Court's holding
in Cabazon. "The shorthand test is whether the conduct at issue violates the State's public policy."
Id. (quoting Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 209).
104. Id. at 1031.
105. Under Connecticut law, the state sanctioned "Las Vegas nights," which were games of
chance conducted by non-profit organizations. Id. at 1029. The court agreed with the district court
that existing Connecticut law permitted gambling, although in a regulated form. Id. at 1031.
106. The court first analyzed the relevant IGRA provision, which states that class III gaming
activities are lawful only if they are conducted in a state which permits such gaming for any purpose
by any person or organization. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B) (1988). Next, the court determined that
the Connecticut law regulated rather than prohibited class III gaming. Therefore, the state had an
obligation to negotiate with the Tribe concerning casino-style gambling. 913 F.2d at 1031-32.
107. 913 F.2d at 1032.
108. Id. at 1032-33.
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good faith or does not respond to the tribe's request to negotiate a com-
pact.109 In Mashantucket, the state had not responded to a tribe's re-
quest, and thus, could not negotiate in good faith. 10 Because the state
refused to negotiate, the court ordered a compact to be concluded."'
After Mashantucket, one other court held that tribes have the right to
engage in class III gaming enterprises."' Since 1991, however, in six out
of eight cases in which the issue was raised,' '3 the states have success-
fully raised an Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity defense. When
the tribes sued the states for failing to negotiate a compact, the courts
granted the states' motions to dismiss based on the belief that Congress
did not have the authority to abrogate the states' immunity through
IGRA. To facilitate an informed discussion of the cases, it is first neces-
sary to outline certain general Eleventh Amendment principles.
III. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND STATE SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY
The Eleventh Amendment provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State.14
By its plain language, the Eleventh Amendment denies federal juris-
diction only in diversity suits, suits "against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
109. Id. For the text of this provision, see supra note 97.
110. Id. at 1032. The court cited NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962) for the rule that if a
party refuses to negotiate, there is no reason to consider the issue of good faith. Id.
111. 913 F.2d at 1032-33.
112. In Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 770 F. Supp.
480 (W.D. Wis. 1991), afd'd, 957 F.2d 515 (7th Cir. 1992), the court held that the state was obligated
to negotiate with the Tribe regarding certain class III activities. Like the State of Connecticut in
Mashantucket, Wisconsin wanted the court to declare that § 2701(5) of IGRA limited the Tribe to
the specific type of gaming activity actually in operation in the state. Because the state only allowed
a lottery and parimutuel betting, Wisconsin asserted that the Tribe was limited to those types of class
III gambling activities and could not negotiate for casino games, such as video gaming machines,
roulette, slot machines, poker, or craps. The court rejected this narrow interpretation of § 2701(5).
Instead, the court focused on whether Wisconsin's general policy toward sophisticated gaming was
prohibitory or regulatory. The court determined that Wisconsin's public policy was regulatory be-
cause amendments to the Wisconsin Constitution allowed a state-run lottery and parimutuel on-
track betting.
113. See supra note 13.
114. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
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State." '  Few commentators, however, interpret the Eleventh Amend-
ment so strictly.' 1 6 In Hans v. Louisiana,'1 7 the Supreme Court ex-
panded the scope of the Eleventh Amendment."' In Hans, the Court
held that the Eleventh Amendment prohibited a citizen of a state from
suing that state in federal court based on federal question jurisdiction. 19
The plaintiff, a Louisiana citizen, attempted to sue the state to collect on
Civil War bonds."2° The state contended that the Eleventh Amendment
prevented its own citizens from suing it, even though this type of protec-
tion was beyond the literal scope of the Amendment. The Court agreed
and held that the state was immune from this suit, stating that it would
be "absurd" to restrict the application of the Amendment to its literal
language.' 2 ' The court reasoned that the state's immunity was "inherent
in the nature of sovereignty."'' 22
Later Supreme Court decisions have limited the Hans doctrine of state
sovereign immunity based on the Eleventh Amendment.'23 Under cer-
115. Id.
116. Apparently, only one commentator has argued that the Eleventh Amendment should be
interpreted this strictly. See Merritt R. Blakeslee, Case Comment, The Eleventh Amendment and
States' Sovereign Immunity from Suit by a Private Citizen: Hans v. Louisiana and its Progeny after
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Company, 24 GA. L. REV. 113, 129-30 (1989) (citing Lawrence C. Mar-
shall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1342, 1349 (1989)).
117. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
118. Id. at 15-18. Since Hans, the Supreme Court has recognized that a variety of suits are not
precluded by the Eleventh Amendment. See, eg., United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140-41
(1965) (reasoning that the Eleventh Amendment does not prevent suits by United States against a
state); Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 393 (1932) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment does
not prevent parties from suing state officials to enjoin them from enforcing state laws that violate
federal law); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56 (1908) (noting that suits may be initiated in
federal courts against state officials sued in their individual capacities for illegal actions); South Da-
kota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 315-16 (1904) (determining that the Eleventh Amendment
does not prevent one state from suing another).
119. Hans, 134 U.S. at 14-15.
120. Id. at 1-3.
121. The Court asked:
Can we suppose that, when the Eleventh Amendment was adopted, it was understood to
be left open for the citizens of a State to sue their own state in the federal courts, whilst the
idea of suits by citizens of other states, or of foreign states, was indignantly repelled? Sup-
pose that Congress, when proposing the Eleventh Amendment, had appended to it a pro-
viso that nothing therein contained should prevent a state from being sued by its own
citizens in cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States: can we imag-
ine that it would have been adopted by the states? The supposition that it would is almost
an absurdity on its face.
Id at 15.
122. Id. at 13 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 508 (Alexander Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed.,
1895)).
123. See infra notes 125-32 and accompanying text.
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tain circumstances, Congress now may abrogate states' sovereign immu-
nity. In Fourteenth Amendment 124 cases, the Court has recognized
federal jurisdiction if clear statutory language conveys congressional in-
tent to override state immunity.125 The Court has held that Section Five
of the Fourteenth Amendment'26 grants Congress the power to abrogate
a state's sovereign immunity. 127 The test for abrogation under the Four-
teenth Amendment, however, is stringent: when legislating pursuant to
the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress can abrogate a state's sovereign
immunity only if the statutory language is "unmistakably clear.' 128
Congress may also override a state's sovereign immunity when it exer-
cises one of its broad legislative powers, such as the commerce power. 29
124. The Fourteenth Amendment provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1.
125. See, eg., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). In Fitzpatrick, the Court stated that
§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, see infra notes 127-28 and accompanying text, limits the scope of
the Eleventh Amendment and the principle of state sovereign immunity. 427 U.S. at 453. The
Court held that the Eleventh Amendment did not prevent a federal court from granting a retroactive
award of wrongfully withheld retirement benefits through the 1972 Amendments to Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 451-56. The 1972 Amendments, passed pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment, authorized federal courts to award money damages to private individuals whenever a
court found that a state government had subjected such an individual to employment discrimination.
Id at 447-48.
126. "The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of
this article." U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 5.
127. See, e.g., supra note 126. As one author notes, there are two arguments for the proposition
that Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment allows Congress to lift sovereign immunity.
The first is the "later in time" argument. Because the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified
subsequent to the Eleventh Amendment, section five of the Fourteenth Amendment carved
out an area of federal power from existing state power. This includes those powers previ-
ously granted to the states, including those immunities granted in the Eleventh Amend-
ment.
The second argument is that the Fourteenth Amendment is a unique limitation on state
power. Section five of the Fourteenth Amendment allocates to Congress the power to
enforce the various sections of the Amendment, including the Due Process provisions. The
Supreme Court is required to balance the state's interest represented by the Eleventh
Amendment with the federal interest in the supremacy of federal law. Thus, the Four-
teenth Amendment trumps existing state power found in the Constitution and Common
Law.
Christopher L. Lafuse, Note, Beyond Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak: Permitting the Indian
Tribes to Sue the States Without Regard to the Eleventh Amendment Bar, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 639,
656-57 (1992) (footnotes omitted).
128. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985).
129. See, eg., Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
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Until 1989, the Court's standard for Commerce Clause cases was difficult
to fulfill. The Court recognized federal court jurisdiction only if Con-
gress legislated pursuant to the Commerce Clause and the state implicitly
waived its sovereign immunity and consented to suit in federal court.
130
The Court loosened this standard somewhat in Pennsylvania v. Union
Gas Co." I In Union Gas, the Court concluded that when the states rati-
fied the Constitution, they gave Congress the authority to regulate com-
merce, thus relinquishing their sovereign immunity in that area. 132 The
holding in Union Gas is clear-Congress abrogates the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity when it legislates pursuant to the Commerce
Clause. However, it is not clear what the holding in Union Gas rests
upon, and courts are without guidance as to how to apply the Union Gas
rule in other contexts. 13
3
In Union Gas, the Court was presented with a two-part question: (1)
does the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) clearly express Congress' intent to per-
mit a suit against a state in federal court; and (2) if so, does Congress
have the authority to abrogate a state's immunity when legislating pursu-
ant to the Commerce Clause?1
34
The Court searched the language in CERCLA and found that Con-
gress clearly intended states to be subjected to the federal courts' jurisdic-
tion. 135 The Court then turned to the broader constitutional question of
whether Congress had the authority to override the state's sovereign im-
munity in this instance. The plurality held that Congress did, indeed,
have this authority when exercising its plenary power to regulate inter-
state commerce. 136 The plurality compared the Commerce Clause to the
Fourteenth Amendment and decided that Congress may abrogate a
state's immunity when legislating pursuant to the Commerce Clause.
137
130. See, eg., Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare,
411 U.S. 279 (1973); Parden, 374 U.S. 184 (1964).
131. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
132. Id. at 14. See also infra note 141.
133. The courts that have faced the Eleventh Amendment-Indian gaming issue have disagreed
on what theory is behind the holding of Union Gas. See infra notes 142-43, 171-92 and accompany-
ing text.
134. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 5.
135. Id. at 13.
136. Id. at 16.
137. Id. at 15-17. The Court pointed to Fitzpatrick in which it held that Congress can abrogate
a state's immunity under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment:
Such enforcement [of the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment] is no invasion of
1993]
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The Commerce Clause, like the Fourteenth Amendment, confers plenary
power to Congress that expands federal power at the expense of the
states. 1 38 The states surrendered part of their sovereignty by approving
the Constitution.'39 By adopting the Commerce Clause, states gave up
their sovereignty in the area of interstate commerce and consented to the
federal government's jurisdiction."4 This argument, that states surren-
dered some of their sovereignty when they ratified the Constitution, is
known as the "plan of convention" theory.' 4'
Since Union Gas, courts have continued to wrestle with the unsettled
doctrine of the states' sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amend-
ment. Nowhere is this struggle more apparent than in recent Eleventh
Amendment-Indian gaming cases. Courts faced with Indian gaming is-
sues have interpreted the holding of Union Gas quite differently. Courts
holding that states may raise a sovereign immunity defense to IGRA be-
lieve that Union Gas rests on the "plan of convention" theory.'42 In con-
State sovereignty. No law can be, which the people of the United states, have... empow-
ered Congress to enact.... [I]n exercising her rights, a State cannot disregard the limita-
tions which the Federal Constitution has applied to her power. Her rights do not reach to
that extent. Nor can she deny to the general government the right to exercise all its
granted powers, though they may interfere with the full enjoyment of rights she would
have if those powers had not been thus granted. Indeed, every addition of power to the
general government involves a corresponding diminution of the governmental powers of
the States. It is carved out of them.
Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1880), quoted in Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 454-55. See also supra
note 126.
The dissent in Union Gas insisted that the plurality was wrong to compare the Commerce Clause
to the Fourteenth Amendment stating:
An interpretation of the original Constitution which permits Congress to eliminate sover-
eign immunity only if it wants to renders the doctrine a practical nullity and is therefore
unreasonable. The Fourteenth Amendment, on the other hand, was avowedly directed
against the power of the States, and permits abrogation of their sovereign immunity only
for a limited purpose.
491 U.S. at 42.
138. Id. at 16. "Plenary power" means "[a]uthority and power as broad as is required in a
given case." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1154 (6th ed. 1990). For an explanation of plenary power
in the context of Indian affairs, see supra note 74.
139. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 14.
140. Id. at 16-20.
141. See id. "We have recognized that the States enjoy no immunity where there has been 'a
surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention.'" Id. (citing Monaco v. Mississippi, 292
U.S. 313, 322-23 (1934) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 657 (Alexander Hamilton) (H. Daw-
son ed., 1876)).
142. See, eg., Pueblo of Sandia v. New Mexico, No. 92-0613 JC (D.N.M. Nov. 13, 1992); Ponca
Tribe of Oklahoma v. Oklahoma, No. 92-988-T (W.D. Okla. Sept. 8, 1992); Poarch Band of Creek
Indians v. Alabama, 776 F. Supp. 550 (S.D. Ala. 1992); Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians
v. Michigan, 800 F. Supp. 1484 (W.D. Mich. 1992); Spokane Tribe of Indians v. Washington, 790 F.
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trast, courts concluding that states cannot raise an Eleventh Amendment
defense view Union Gas as premised on Congress' plenary power, not on
the "plan of convention" theory.
1 43
Thus, the way in which courts interpret Union Gas is critical to the
success or failure of class III Indian gaming. A later decision, Blatchford
v. Native Village ofNoatak,1" although not an Indian gaming case, high-
lighted the Eleventh Amendment controversy in the context of Indian
affairs. In Blatchford, the Supreme Court addressed the question
whether federal courts have jurisdiction over an Indian tribe's suit
against a state for a violation of a state statute.1 45 The Court decided
that the Eleventh Amendment protected the state from such suits.146 In
doing so, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's holding that through
their acceptance of the Commerce Clause, states consented to suits from
the Indian tribes. The Ninth Circuit concluded that allowing federal
courts to have jurisdiction over suits brought by tribes was part of the
inherent plan of the Constitution. 147
The Supreme Court disagreed. The Court held that in adopting the
Constitution, states made mutual concessions to allow themselves to sue
one another; however, no state surrendered immunity with respect to In-
dian tribes.1 48 The Court reasoned that the states could not have made
such a mutual concession with the Indians because the tribes were not
parties to the Constitutional Convention.149
Blatchford is important because it held that states did not waive their
Supp. 1057 (E.D. Wash. 1991); Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Mississippi, No. CIv.A.J90-
0386(B), 1991 WL 255614 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 9, 1991).
For an explanation of the "plan of convention" theory, see supra note 141 and accompanying text.
143. See Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, No. 92-3009 (D.S.D. Jan. 8, 1993); Semi-
nole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 801 F. Supp. 655 (S.D. Fla. 1992). See supra note 138 for a defini-
tion of plenary power.
144. 111 S Ct. 2578 (1991).
145. Id. at 2580-81. Alaska enacted a revenue-sharing statute in 1980 which provided for pay-
ments to Eskimo villages. Id. The Commissioner of Alaska's Department of Community and Re-
gional Affairs, however, on the advice of the state's Attorney General, enlarged the program to
include non-Native communities as well. Id. By including other communities, the Commissioner
effectively reduced the amount of money Eskimo communities received. The Native Village of
Noatak brought suit against the Commissioner, alleging that the state had failed to provide the funds
authorized by the state legislature. Ia
146. Id. at 2580-86.
147. Native Village of Noatak v. Hoffman, 896 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1989).
148. Id. at 2582.
149. Id. The court stated: "But if the convention could not surrender the tribes' immunity for
the benefit of the States, we do not believe that it surrendered the States' immunity for the benefit of
the tribes."
1993]
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immunity against suits by Indian tribes in the "plan of convention,"150
and made clear courts' interpretations of Union Gas often determine the
outcomes of Eleventh Amendment-Indian gaming cases. In Blatchford,
one of the bases of the Court's decision in Union Gas-that states waived
their sovereign immunity when they ratified the Constitution-was re-
jected for Indian law issues. Therefore, courts that believe Union Gas
rests primarily on a "plan of convention" theory also believe that Union
Gas does not apply to Eleventh Amendment-Indian gaming cases. 5
IV. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT-INDIAN GAMING CASES
The courts that have faced the Eleventh Amendment question in the
context of Indian gaming have framed their legal analysis according to
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.'52 These courts asked first, whether
IGRA expresses clear congressional intent to abrogate the states' sover-
eign immunity, and next, whether Congress has such authority.'53 The
first question of congressional intent has not been seriously contested.
Even the courts that have ultimately decided that states may assert an
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity defense presume that under
section 2710(d)(7)(A) of IGRA 1'54 "Congress clearly intended to subject
the States to suit in federal court."'' 55
150. Id. at 2580-82.
151. See infra notes 170-92 and accompanying text.
152. 491 U.S. 1 (1989). See supra notes 131-141 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Supreme Court's analysis in Union Gas.
153. See infra notes 154-92 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 83.
155. Ponca Tribe of Oklahoma v. Oklahoma, No. 92-988-T, slip op. at 6 (W.D. Okla. 1992). See
also Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 801 F. Supp. 655, 658 (S.D. Fla. 1992) ("It is beyond
peradventure that, in expressly providing for federal jurisdiction over claims brought by Indian
tribes against States to compel good faith negotiations under IGRA (or to remedy the lack of such
negotiations), Congress made its intention to abrogate the States' immunity in this context 'unmis-
takably clear in the language of the statute.' ") (quoting Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473
U.S. 234, 242 (1985)); Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Michigan, 800 F. Supp. 1484,
1489 (W.D. Mich. 1992) (finding that the Act "is a clear statement of waiver of sovereign immu-
nity[ ]"); Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Alabama, 776 F. Supp. 550, 557 (S.D. Ala. 1991) ("[Tjhis
Court has little doubt but that IGRA's attempted abrogation of state immunity is clear enough to do
so if Congress has the power to abrogate in this situation.").
In Spokane Tribe of Indians v. Washington, 790 F. Supp. 1057 (E.D. Wash. 1991), however, the
court thought it did not need to decide the issue. 790 F. Supp. at 1061. "Having determined that
Congress did not have the authority to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity in the Indian Gam-
ing Regulatory Act, it is not necessary to address whether Congress used 'unmistakably clear' lan-
guage in an attempt to abrogate States' immunity." Two courts also reviewed whether 28 U.S.C.
§ 1362, which had previously established federal court jurisdiction by abrogating the states' Eleventh
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The second part of the courts' analysis-whether Congress has the au-
thority to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity under IGRA-has
been considerably more controversial and complex.
In several cases, the tribes contended that Congress did not need to
abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity because the states
had waived their immunity, either expressly or implicitly. In Poarch
Band of Creek Indians v. Alabama,156 for example, the Tribe argued that
the state of Alabama had consented to suit in federal court because the
state had entered into compact negotiations with the Tribe.15 7 The court
quickly disposed of this argument by concluding that courts can only
recognize a state's consent if it is expressed in a legislative enactment.1 58
No express consent occurred in Poarch Band because the Alabama legis-
lature did not consent to suit.159 No other tribe has made an express
consent argument.160
Several tribes, however, have argued that states implicitly consented to
suit in federal courts and waived their sovereign immunity when IGRA
was enacted. A common variation of the implied consent argument is
the "plan of convention" argument. 61 In Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chip-
pewa Indians v. Michigan,62 the Tribe argued that when the states en-
tered the Union, they gave up certain attributes of sovereignty.1 63 The
Tribe asserted that the states surrendered their sovereignty in the area of
Amendment immunity when a suit was brought by an Indian tribe, provided an alternative basis for
federal jurisdiction. Section § 1362 provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, brought by any Indian
tribe or band with a governing body duly recognized by the Secretary of the Interior,
wherein the matter in controversy arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States.
The courts ruled that § 1362 did not apply. See Spokane Tribe, 790 F. Supp. at 1059-60 (noting that
in Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, II S.Ct. 2578 (1991), the Supreme Court determined
that § 1362 does not establish federal jurisdiction "in and of itself"). Accord Sault Ste. Marie Tribe,
800 F. Supp. at 1487.
156. 776 F. Supp. 550 (S.D. Ala. 1991).
157. Id. at 554.
158. Id. The court noted that in Carr v. City of Florence, Ala., 916 F.2d 1521, 1524 (11th Cir.
1990), the Eleventh Circuit ruled that express consent must be through legislative enactment.
159. Poarch Band, 776 F. Supp. at 554.
160. In Spokane Tribe, however, the court devoted a small section of its opinion to this issue.
790 F. Supp. at 1060. The court noted that express consent was not argued and that there was no
basis for finding expressed consent. The court cited to the Supreme Court holding in Clark v. Bar-
nard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883), for the rule that the only way a state may lose its immunity is to
expressly consent to suit in federal court. 790 F. Supp. at 1060.
161. See supra note 141.
162. 800 F. Supp. 1484 (W.D. Mich. 1992).
163. Id. at 1488.
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interstate commerce and that Supreme Court decisions hold that state
sovereignty cannot be used to prohibit Congress from regulating inter-
state commerce. 164 The Tribe further argued that states had also relin-
quished their sovereignty under the Indian Commerce Clause when they
ratified the Constitution.165 The Indian Commerce Clause allows Con-
gress "[t]o regulate commerce... with the Indian tribes[.]' 166
The court in Sault Ste. Marie Tribe disagreed with the Tribe. Instead,
it relied on Blatchford in which the Court held that states had not waived
their immunity against Indian tribes when the states adopted the Consti-
tution.167 The Sault Ste. Marie Tribe court noted that there were differ-
ences between this case and Blatchford, 6 but it decided that states did
not implicitly surrender their sovereignty under IGRA.169
In Poarch Band, the court also rejected the Tribe's "plan of conven-
tion" argument. The Tribe argued that because the state of Alabama had
accepted the benefits of IGRA, the State must have realized that partici-
pation in this federal program was conditioned on a waiver of sovereign
immunity.17 The Poarch Tribe relied heavily on the Supreme Court's
decision in Parden v. Terminal Railway. 7 ' In Parden, the Supreme
Court held that when a state chooses to engage in business that is regu-
lated by the federal government pursuant to the Commerce Clause, that
state implicitly consents to the federal courts' jurisdiction.172
The court found two reasons to reject the Poarch Tribe's arguments.
First, the court declared that Parden had been limited by later Supreme
Court decisions.1 73 Second, according to the court, even if Parden was
164. Id. The Tribe cited Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 5 (1989) and Parden v.
Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
165. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe, 800 F. Supp. at 1488.
166. U.S. CONST. art.I, § 8, cl. 3. See also supra note 14.
167. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe, the court cited Blatchford, 111 S.Ct. at 2582.
168. Specifically, the court noted that in Blatchford "the Court did not consider whether the
states had agreed to the surrender of sovereign immunity when Congress legislated pursuant to the
Indian Commerce Clause." 800 F. Supp. at 1488. The Court in Blatchford only determined
whether the states had surrendered their sovereign immunity vis-A-vis Indian tribes when the Consti-
tution was adopted. Id.
169. Id
170. 776 F. Supp. at 556.
171. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
172. 776 F. Supp. at 556 (citing Parden, 377 U.S. at 192).
173. Id. at 556-57. The court referred to several decisions that limited Parden: Welch v. Texas
Dep't of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473
U.S. 273 (1985); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health &
Welfare v. Missouri, 411 U.S. 279 (1973). The court stated:
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controlling, the decision did not apply. Alabama did not engage in gam-
bling or receive any federal funds for negotiating a compact with the
Tribe.1 74 In fact, the court indicated that because IGRA demands that
states negotiate with tribes, the Act attempts to abrogate the states' im-
munity. The states do not truly consent under IGRA. Therefore, under
the Parden doctrine, the state of Alabama did not consent to federal ju-
risdiction.17 Other Eleventh Amendment-Indian gaming decisions have
also rejected the "plan of convention" consent argument. 176
Although no court has accepted the argument that states implicitly
consented to federal jurisdiction under IGRA, courts have divided on
whether Congress may abrogate the states' sovereign immunity under
IGRA. Two courts decided that Congress abrogated the states' sover-
eign immunity under the Act, legislating pursuant to the Indian Com-
merce Clause. 1 77 Five other courts ruled that Congress cannot abrogate
the states' immunity when legislating pursuant to the Indian Commerce
Later cases have not read the Parden exception expansively. No Supreme Court decision
except Parden itself, which was a five-four decision, has found consent under the Parden
theory, and the requirement that Congress' intention to condition a state's participation in
federally regulated activities on a forfeiture of sovereign immunity be clearly expressed has
been strengthened so that already part of Parden stands overruled.
Poarch Band, 776 F. Supp. at 556.
174. 776 F. Supp. at 557.
175. Id.
176. In Ponca Tribe of Oklahoma v. Oklahoma, No. 92-988-T (W.D. Okla. Sept. 8, 1992), the
court found Parden inapplicable:
Parden is inapplicable, as it was premised on the theory that by becoming a common
carrier in interstate commerce, the State of Alabama had entered a field of economic activ-
ity that was federally regulated and had implicitly consented to be bound by that regulation
and be subject to suit in federal court .... Here the state has not voluntarily '[left] the
sphere that is exclusively its own and enter[ed] into activities subject to congressional
regulation.'
Ponca Tribe, No. 92-988-T, slip op. at 5 (quoting Parden, 377 U.S. at 196).
Interestingly, even in one of the decisions in which a court held that the state was not immune, the
court decided not to base its decision on an implied consent theory. Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida, 801 F. Supp. 655 (S.D. Fla. 1992). The court explained:
We thus rest today's decision primarily on Congress' plenary power over Indian affairs,
rather than on a "mutuality in the plan of convention" theory, for a number of reasons.
First, an explication of plenary congressional power is, in our view, the central thrust of
Union Gas, and is a proper basis on which to find congressional power to abrogate. In
addition, the latter theory seemingly begs the question by presuming that the states have
already ceded their sovereignty. Finally, we think, "plan of convention" cession is more
properly a "waiver" argument than an "abrogation" argument, and in the Indian affairs
context, was rejected in Blatchford[.]
Id. at 655, 661 n.6.
177. See, eg., Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, No. 92-3009 (D.S.D. Jan. 8, 1993);
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 801 F. Supp. 655 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
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Clause. 178
In Poarch Band, the court rejected the Tribe's arguments that legisla-
tion enacted pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause abrogates states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity. 179 The Tribe relied on Union Gas for
the proposition that because Congress has the authority to abrogate the
states' immunity when legislating pursuant to the Interstate Commerce
Clause,180 it can also override the states' immunity under the equally
broad Indian Commerce Clause.'81 The court disagreed, reasoning that
the holding in Union Gas was too "unstable" to extend to the Indian
Commerce Clause.'8 2  Additionally, the court saw differences between
the two commerce clauses. Although Congress may abrogate the states'
immunity pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Clause, it may not do so
pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause.183  Four other courts em-
ployed similar reasoning to conclude that Congress cannot abrogate the
states' sovereign immunity through IGRA, enacted pursuant to the In-
178. See Pueblo of Sandia v. New Mexico, No. 92-0613 JC (D.N.M. Nov. 13, 1992); Ponca
Tribe of Oklahoma v. Oklahoma, No. 92-988-T (W.D. Okla. Sept. 8, 1992); Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of
Chippewa Indians v. Michigan, 800 F. Supp. 1484 (W.D. Mich. 1992); Poarch Band of Creek Indi-
ans v. Alabama, 776 F. Supp. 550 (S.D. Ala. 1991); Spokane Tribe of Indians v. Washington, 790 F.
Supp. 1057 (E.D. Wash. 1991).
179. 776 F. Supp. at 558-59.
180. Id. at 558.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 558-59. The court found several reasons not to rely on Union Gas as controlling
precedent. First, the court described the decision in Union Gas as resting on a "four-and-a-halP'-
vote majority. Id. In his concurring opinion, Justice White said only: "I agree with the conclusion
reached by Justice Brennan in Part III of his opinion, that Congress has the authority under Article
I to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the States, although I do not agree with much
of his reasoning." Id. at 558 (quoting Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 57). Also, the court noted that
because Union Gas is not directly on point, it should not be given an expansive reading. Moreover,
Justices Brennan and Marshall, who joined the plurality opinion, are no longer on the Court. Three
of the current members joined Justice Scalia's dissent, and he noted that the holding in Union Gas
was not likely to endure. 776 F. Supp. at 559.
183. Id. at 559. The court noted that even the Supreme Court acknowledged that the Indian
Commerce Clause and the Interstate Commerce Clause are different. Id. The Poarch Band court
acknowledged that in Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S.163, 192 (1989), the
Supreme Court stated: "The extensive case law that has developed under the Interstate Commerce
Clause[ ] is premised on a structural understanding of the unique role of the states in our constitu-
tional system that is not readily imported to cases involving the Indian Commerce Clause." 776 F.
Supp. at 559 (alteration in original). Therefore, the court in Poarch Band was wary of extending the
Union Gas holding to mean that Congress may abrogate a state's immunity when legislating pursu-
ant to the Indian Commerce Clause. 776 F. Supp. at 559. Finally, the court reasoned that the
Indian Commerce Clause of Article I, which was adopted before the Eleventh Amendment, could
not restrict the operation of the latter Amendment. 776 F. Supp. at 559.
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dian Commerce Clause."8 4
In Seminole Tribe, however, the court ruled that Congress properly
abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity through IGRA. I 5
The court first observed that Congress has the authority to regulate In-
dian affairs through the Indian Commerce Clause, second, that Indian
issues are "uniquely federal," and additionally, that congressional au-
thority over Indian affairs is plenary.18 6 Next, the court noted that Con-
gress may abrogate the states' immunity when it acts pursuant to its
plenary power embodied in the Constitution. 7 The court reasoned that
when Congress legislates pursuant to its plenary power in relation to In-
dian tribes, there is a strong basis to find congressional authority to abro-
gate states' immunity. 88
The court then compared Seminole Tribe to Union Gas.189 In the
court's opinion, the holding in Union Gas rested on two grounds. Most
importantly, stated the court, Congress has the authority to abrogate the
states' immunity when legislating pursuant to the Interstate Commerce
184. In Spokane Tribe, the court held that Congress may not properly abrogate states' sovereign
immunity when acting pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause. 790 F. Supp. at 1060-61. As in
Poarch Band, the court in Spokane Tribe decided that the applications of the two commerce clauses
were distinguishable. The court cited Blatchford, in which the Supreme Court noted that the states
had surrendered immunity to each other, creating a "mutuality of concessions." Id. at 1061. How-
ever, because the tribes have retained their immunity to suits by the states, no mutuality exists. Id.
(citing Blatchford, I ll S.Ct. at 2583). Therefore, the fact that Congress may abrogate the states'
authority pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Clause does not mean that Congress may do so
pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause. Id Accord Sault Ste. Marie Tribe, 800 F. Supp. at 1489;
Ponca Tribe, No. 92-988-T, slip op. at 6-8.
185. 801 F. Supp. at 658-63.
186. Id. at 658-60. The Court found support for these propositions in several earlier Supreme
Court decisions, including: Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989) (hold-
ing that the Indian Commerce Clause provides Congress with plenary power over Indian affairs);
Oneida County, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 470 U.S. 226, 234-35 (1985) (reasoning that
once the Constitution was adopted, the federal government had exclusive control over Indian af-
fairs); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980) (noting that Congress has
broad authority to regulate Indian affairs under the Indian Commerce Clause); Morton v. Mancari,
417 U.S. 535, 551-52 (1974) ("Resolution of the instant issue... turns on the unique federal status of
Indian tribes under federal law and upon the plenary power of Congress, based on a history of
treaties and the assumption of a 'guardian-ward' status.... The plenary power of Congress to deal
with the special problems of Indians is drawn both explicitly and implicitly from the Constitution
itself."); Worchester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 558-59 (1832) (declaring that in the Constitu-
tion, Congress was granted the power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes, removing the
restraints of the Articles of Confederation).
187. Seminole Tribe, 801 F. Supp. at 660. The first case the court cited for support was Union
Gas, 490 U.S. at 15.
188. Seminole Tribe, 801 F. Supp. at 660.
189. Id. at 660-61.
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Clause because Congress' authority over interstate commerce is ple-
nary.190 Congress also has this authority under the "plan of convention"
because the states surrendered their immunity in the area of interstate
commerce when they adopted the Constitution. 191 The court concluded
that Congress has the power to abrogate the states' immunity pursuant to
the Indian Commerce Clause because Congress has plenary power over
Indian affairs that is "at least as broad as Congress' interstate power."' 192
The court in Seminole Tribe concluded by commenting on the defend-
ant's arguments. 193 The defendant based its arguments on the Sault Ste.
Marie Tribe, Spokane Tribe, and Poarch Band decisions. 194 First, the
defendant noted that the earlier Indian gaming decisions doubted the ap-
plicability and "continuing vitality of Union Gas." 195 The court main-
tained, however, that Union Gas was binding. 196 Moreover, the court
decided that because the Indian Commerce Clause is in the same clause
of the Constitution as the Interstate Commerce Clause, 197 and because
Congress' power in both areas is plenary, the holding and reasoning of
Union Gas apply to Eleventh Amendment-Indian gaming cases. 1 98
The Seminole Tribe court rejected all of the defendant's attempts to
distinguish the Interstate and Indian Commerce Clauses. 199 The court
noted that in oral argument, the defendant had admitted that Congress'
power to abrogate the states' immunity in Indian commerce was just as
great with respect to interstate commerce. 200 The defendant then cited
190. Id. See supra notes 131-41 and accompanying text for a more complete explanation of the
Union Gas decision.
191. 801 F. Supp. at 660-61. However, in a footnote, the court explained why it did not rest its
opinion on a "plan of convention" theory. See id. at 660-61 n.7. See also supra note 176.
192. 801 F. Supp. at 661. In a footnote, the court referred to several cases and law review
articles that concluded that the Indian Commerce Clause should be read at least as broadly as the
Interstate Commerce Clause. Id. at 662-63 n.8.
193. Id. at 661-63.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 661. In particular, the court in Seminole Tribe noted that in Poarch Band, the court
thought that Union Gas rested on shaky ground because of its plurality opinion. Id. (citing Poarch
Band, 776 F. Supp. at 558).
196. Seminole Tribe, 801 F. Supp. at 661.
197. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See also supra note 14.
198. 801 F. Supp. at 661.
199. Id. at 662. The court commented: "[C]ongressional power over both interstate and Indian
commerce derives from the same clause in the Constitution; and we are hard pressed to conclude
that the congressional authority to abrogate the States' immunity in the area of interstate commerce
is greater than in Indian commerce." Id.
200. Id. at 662. The opinion provided a portion of the oral argument:
THE COURT: [I]s congressional authority under Article I, Section 8, dealing with the
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language from a Supreme Court decision which suggested that the two
clauses had different applications.2 "1 However, the court interpreted that
language to mean that Congress' power to legislate under the Indian
Commerce Clause was just as great as its legislative authority under the
Interstate Commerce Clause.20 2
Finally, the defendant relied on Blatchford to argue that the Indian
Commerce Clause does not give Congress the authority to abrogate a
state's sovereign immunity.2°3  The court, however, disagreed. In the
court's view, Blatchford merely held that when the states adopted the
Constitution, they did not waive their immunity to all suits by Indian
tribes.2 4 The decision would therefore not support the defendant's abro-
gation argument because it did not address Congress' authority to abro-
gate a state's immunity.20 5
To date, the key issue in Eleventh Amendment-Indian gaming cases
has been whether Congress has the authority to abrogate the states' im-
munity under IGRA. Although other arguments have been advanced by
power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes any less sweeping than the power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States?
MR. GLOGAU: No, it is not.
201. The defendant quoted Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989), in
which the Court noted that "[ilt is also well established that the Interstate Commerce and Indian
Commerce Clauses have very different applications." 801 F. Supp. at 662.
202. The court in Seminole Tribe quoted from a later section of the Cotton Petroleum opinion:
In particular, while the Interstate Commerce Clause is concerned with maintaining free
trade among the States even in the absence of implementing federal legislation, the central
function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to provide Congress with plenary power to legis-
late in the field of Indian affairs.
801 F. Supp. at 663 (emphasis in original) (quoting Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 192).
203. 801 F. Supp. at 663.
204. Id.
205. Id. The court explained:
[The defendant's] reliance is misplaced, we think, since Blatchford is primarily a "waiver"
case, and its concerns over a lack of "mutuality of... concession"[between the tribes and
the states] .... are properly limited to that context. But even if, as Defendants assert, the
.waiver" principles enunciated in Blatchford can be said to speak to Congress' power to
abrogate-and we think they do not-the lack of State-Indian mutuality is a matter of
relatively minor importance. First, Congress' plenary power over the uniquely federal area
of Indian affairs is the primary basis on which we rest today's decision. Second, we are not
persuaded that a lack of mutuality between the States and the Indian nations is a compel-
ling deficiency, since there did in fact exist a mutuality between the federal government-in
which plenary power to regulate Indian affairs was vested-and the States. And although
the lack of State-Indian mutuality may undercut the argument that the States waived their
immunity to any and all suits by Indian tribes, the importance of that want of mutuality is
diminished when a suit is brought pursuant to explicit congressional authorization, since
the linchpin of abrogation must be the nature of the power pursuant to which Congress
raised the Eleventh Amendment barrier.
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both tribes and states,2 "6 the resolution of the Eleventh Amendment issue
has determined the success or demise of high-stakes Indian gambling.
206. Several additional arguments are worthy of note. First, in several cases, tribes have argued
that by the Exparte Young doctrine, the tribe may sue individual state officials, such as the gover-
nor, even if the Eleventh Amendment bars the tribes from suing the states directly. In Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the Supreme Court established that the Eleventh Amendment does not
prevent a suit in federal court to enjoin state officials from acting in violation of the Constitution or
federal laws. In Spokane Tribe, for example, the court concluded that IGRA established federal
court jurisdiction against the individual defendants, Governor Gardner and Deputy Director Miller.
790 F. Supp. at 1063. Therefore, even though the court in Spokane Tribe granted the defendant-
state's motion to dismiss based on the Eleventh Amendment, it denied the defendant's motion to
dismiss the suit against the named individuals. Id.
In Poarch Band, too, the Tribe urged that according to the Ex parte Young doctrine, the federal
district court had jurisdiction under IGRA to hear the suit against the Governor in his official
capacity. In the first Poarch Band case, 776 F. Supp. 550 (S.D.Ala. 1991), the court did not decide
the Exparte Young issue. However, in a subsequent case in which the Ex parte Young doctrine was
the sole issue, Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Alabama, No. 91-0757-AH-M (S.D.Ala. 1992), the
court decided that the suit against the Governor was actually a suit against the State of Alabama.
Therefore, the court granted the Governor's motion to dismiss. Accord Ponca Tribe, No. 92-988-T,
slip op. at 8-9; Pueblo of Sandia, No. 92-0613JC, slip op. at 1.
Second, in Sault Ste Marie Tribe, the Tribe employed a novel strategy. The Tribe asserted that
IGRA was adopted pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Clause as well as the Indian Commerce
Clause and that Union Gas should be directly controlling. Accordingly, the Tribe asserted that the
court should find that Congress has the authority to abrogate the states' immunity under IGRA.
800 F. Supp. at 1490. The court agreed with the Tribe that one of the purposes of the Act was to
protect against the infiltration of organized crime. Id. However, in the court's opinion, the Indian
Commerce Clause, not the Interstate Commerce Clause, provided Congress with the authority to
regulate in this manner. Id
Third, the court in Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe found additional reasons why the Eleventh
Amendment does not prevent a suit under IGRA's jurisdictional provision, § 2710 (d)(7)(A). One
reason was that no monetary or injunctive relief could be sought against the state. Cheyenne River
Sioux Tribe, No. 92-3009, slip op. at 6. Additionally, South Dakota, the defendant, could not shield
itself behind the Amendment because in the past, the state had "actively engaged in negotiating
State-Tribal gaming compacts. It ha[d] reaped benefits from these negotiations by being able to
provide input into how Indian gaming will be conducted within the state." Id.
Finally, in Ponca Tribe and in Pueblo of Sandia, the courts imposed an additional jurisdictional
barrier to federal court access in class III cases. The courts found that the Tenth Amendment, as
well as the Eleventh, precluded the tribes' from suing the states. Ponca Tribe, No. 92-988-T, slip op.
at 9-12; Pueblo of Sandia, No. 92-0613-JC, slip op. at 3. In Ponca Tribe, the State pointed to the
recent Tenth Amendment case, New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992). In New York,
the Supreme Court considered whether Congress improperly directed the states to regulate waste
disposal in the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985. The Court held that
although Congress can urge a state to adopt a legislative program that conforms to federal interests,
it cannot compel the state to regulate. 112 S. Ct. at 2434-35. The court in Ponca Tribe applied the
rule from New York and decided that "a critical alternative is missing in IGRA-a State may not
simply decline to regulate Class III gaming; it does not have the option of refusing to act." Ponca
Tribe, No. 92-988-T slip op. at 11. Accord Pueblo of Sandia, No. 92-0613-JC, slip op. at 3. Contra
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, No. 92-3009, slip op. at 6-9. Therefore, the court in Ponca Tribe con-
cluded that IGRA violated the Tenth Amendment, and the court granted the State's motion to
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V. Two JUDICIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
DILEMMA
Upon learning that in six out of eight decisions, federal district courts
have held that states may successfully raise an Eleventh Amendment de-
fense to tribal suits for class III gaming negotiations, 20 7 many observers
are likely to assume that the states have won the war in Eleventh
Amendment-Indian gaming cases. However, closer inspection reveals
that only two courts---the District Court for the Southern District of
Florida in Seminole Tribe and the District Court for the District of
South Dakota in Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe-have reached the proper
result on this issue.
Of the eight decisions, only Seminole Tribe and Cheyenne River Sioux
Tribe are correct because they allow the purposes of IGRA to be imple-
mented. 208 Both tribes now have the opportunity to generate revenue
through class III, casino-style activities precisely because the courts re-
jected the states' Eleventh Amendment defenses.209 The tribes in the
other six cases, cannot even begin to develop sophisticated gambling op-
erations because the federal courts have refused to hear the merits of
their cases.210
In Seminole Tribe, the court correctly concluded that the scope of
Congress' power under the Indian Commerce Clause is the same as it is
under the Interstate Commerce Clause.211 In reality, the "two clauses"
are not distinct, but exist in the same clause of the Constitution,2 12 and
Congress has broad power when legislating under both clauses.213
dismiss based on both the Eleventh and Tenth Amendments. Ponca Tribe, No. 92-988-T, slip op. at
12.
The Ponca Tribe and Pueblo of Sandia decisions could have broad implications for future Indian
gaming cases. These decisions are two of the most recent Eleventh Amendment-Indian gaming cases
and are the first to consider and accept Tenth Amendment as well as Eleventh Amendment chal-
lenges to the jurisdictional provision of IGRA. See supra note 83. Unless future courts adopt a
different judicial framework that is similar to the proposal in Part V of this Note, the tribes will have
a difficult task overcoming two, previously-accepted, constitutional arguments against § 2710(d)(7).
207. See supra note 13.
208. See supra note 3 for the expressed statutory purpose of IGRA.
209. See Seminole Tribe, 801 F. Supp. at 655; Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, No. 92-3009, slip op.
at 6.
210. The courts did not consider the substance of the cases because they granted the states'
motions to dismiss. See supra note 13.
211. 801 F. Supp. at 660-63.
212. See supra note 14.
213. See, eg., Seminole Tribe, 801 F. Supp at 661 ("Since Congress clearly possesses complete
and plenary authority in the area of Indian affairs, which is at least as broad as Congress' interstate
19931
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Therefore, just as Union Gas decided that Congress may abrogate the
states' immunity when legislating pursuant to the Interstate Commerce
Clause,214 Seminole Tribe properly held that Congress may also abrogate
the states' immunity pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause.215
Nevertheless, even the court in Seminole Tribe did not fully address
this issue in its proper legal framework. As shown earlier, in all eight
decisions the courts' interpretations of Union Gas2" 6 have determined
whether Congress may properly subject the states to suit in federal court
through section 2710(d)(7) of IGRA.21 7 However, the future of class III
gaming does not need to rest on such an unsatisfactory and unstable
foundation.
All eight courts have failed to consider a long-standing canon of In-
dian law. Language in federal statutes that deal with Indian tribes must
be liberally construed or interpreted in favor of the tribes.218 This liberal
construction rule is derived from the historical relationship between Con-
commerce power ... we hold that Congress has the power to abrogate the States' immunity pursu-
ant to the Indian Commerce Clause.") (footnote omitted).
214. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 15-17. See also supra notes 132-41 and accompanying text.
215. See Seminole Tribe, 801 F. Supp. at 658-63. See also supra notes 185-92 and accompanying
text.
216. The six courts that allowed the Eleventh Amendment defense believed that Union Gas
rested on a "plan of convention" theory. See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
In contrast, the courts in Seminole Tribe and Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe decided that Union Gas
was premised on the theory that Congress' power over interstate commerce is plenary. Because
Congress' power over Indian affairs is also plenary, Congress may abrogate the states' immunity by
enacting legislation, such as IGRA, under the Indian Commerce Clause.
See also supra notes 179-94 and accompanying text.
217. See supra note 83.
218. One IGRA case employed the liberal construction rule on an unrelated issue. See Oneida
Tribe of Indians of Wisconsin v. Wisconsin, 951 F.2d 757 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that the liberal
construction rule should be applied to determine whether a proposed gambling activity should be
classified as class II or class III). The rule has been applied in many other Indian cases, See gener-
ally Worchester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 582 (1832) (noting that language in various treaties
between the Cherokees and United States "should never be construed to [the Indians'] prejudice");
Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1908) (stating that where there are two possible
interpretations, the liberal construction rule should be applied to support the purpose of an agree-
ment); Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 11 S.Ct. 2578, 2589-90 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting) (holding that 25 U.S.C. § 1362, which provides that federal district courts have jurisdiction
of all civil actions brought by Indian tribes, should include tribal litigation that the federal govern-
ment could have brought as the tribes' guardian); Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 212 (1975)
(Douglas, J., concurring) ("The construction, instead of being strict, is liberal; doubtful expressions,
instead of being resolved in favor of the United States, are to be resolved in favor of a weak, and
defenseless people, who are wards of the nation." (quoting from Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675
(1912)).
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gress and the Indian tribes.219 Early Supreme Court cases recognized
that Congress is a guardian of the tribes.220 Moreover, historically, the
agreements made between the tribes and the United States have fre-
quently been disadvantageous to the Indians.22' Therefore, when Con-
gress enacts legislation that affects Indian tribes, courts should presume
that Congress intended that the law would benefit the tribes.222
Certainly, the liberal construction canon should apply to IGRA. The
legislative history, expressed statutory purpose, and comments of indi-
vidual members of Congress clearly indicate that IGRA was passed for
the benefit of Indian tribes.223 In all eight Eleventh Amendment-Indian
gaming cases, the courts arrived at legally supportable conclusions, find-
ing section 2710(d)(7) either valid or invalid.224 Because both interpreta-
tions are legally supportable, however, the canon of liberal construction
should break the tie, and favor the tribes' position. Results in IGRA
cases will be much more consistent if federal courts apply this liberal
219. See COHEN, supra note 57, at 172-73. Cohen describes the reasons for the rule:
Doubtful clauses in treaties or agreements between the United States and the Indian tribes
have often been resolved by the courts in a nontechnical way, as the Indians would have
understood the language and in their favor. The Supreme Court of the United States
stated, per Justice Matthews, in the case of Choctaw Nation v. United States, [119 U.S. 1
(1886)]:
The recognized relation between the parties to this controversy, therefore, is that
between a superior and an inferior, whereby the latter is placed under the care and
control of the former, and which, while it authorizes the adoption on the part of the
United States of such policy as their own public interests may dictate, recognizes, on
the other hand, such an interpretation of their acts and promises as justice and reason
demand in all cases where power is exerted by the strong over those to whom they owe
care and protection.
[Id.] at 28.
The principle of construction in favor of the Indians is also applicable to congressional
statutes.. . . The theory also helps to explain the rule of statutory construction, often
recited but not always followed, that general acts of Congress do not apply to Indians, if
their application would affect the Indians adversely, unless congressional intent to include
them is clear.
COHEN, supra note 57, at 172-73 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
220. See supra note 74. Cohen noted that, "the practical significance of the wardship concept
... is to justify certain types of legislation that would otherwise be held unconstitutional." COHEN,
supra note 57, at 171.
221. See, eg., Wilcomb Washburn, The Historical Context of American Indian Legal Problems,
in AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE LAW 12 (L. Rosen ed., 1976); P. GATES, THE RAPE OF INDIAN
LANDS (1979); Winifred T. Gross, Note, Tribal Resources: Federal Trust Responsibility: United
States Energy Development Versus Trust Responsibilities to Indian Tribes, 9 AM. INDIAN L. REv.
309, 317 (1981) (citing United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192 (W.D. Mich. 1979)).
222. See supra note 218.
223. See supra notes 1-3, 56-59, 72-77 and accompanying text.
224. See part IV and accompanying footnotes.
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construction canon in the future. Courts will then recognize that plausi-
ble arguments exist to find section 2710(d)(7) constitutional or unconsti-
tutional, 225 but that as a matter of law, the section is valid in the context
of Indian affairs. States, therefore, may not assert an Eleventh Amend-
ment defense to IGRA because section 2710(d)(7) vests jurisdiction in
the federal courts to resolve tribal-state conflicts regarding class III
gaming.
Courts might also reach this same result by adopting a second, more
novel approach. As mentioned, the liberal construction canon is derived
from Congress' historical role as a guardian of Indian tribes.226
Although the Supreme Court has been given no such formal role, the
Court, too, has assumed a special responsibility toward the Indian tribes.
The foundation of Indian law began with the judicial branch, not with
the executive or legislative branches. 227 Language in both old and mod-
em decisions reflects the Court's concern with the tribes' well-being. In
many opinions, the Court has said that the "Federal Government" or
"the Court" (as opposed to simply "Congress") has a duty to protect the
Indian tribes. 228 Therefore, it seems reasonable and within the spirit of
225. See supra note 224.
226. See supra notes 218-19.
227. In Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30
U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), and Worchester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832)-the so-called "Mar-
shall Trilogy"-the Supreme Court handed down the opinions that formed the foundation of federal
Indian law.
At the time of the Marshall Trilogy, neither Congress nor the President was either willing or able
to establish a consistent set of rules for dealing with Indian tribes. President Jackson was clearly
antagonistic toward Indian interests. In referring to Worchester, in which the court struck down
state laws and released a defendant-missionary who was convicted of preaching to the Indians, Jack-
son purportedly declared: "John Marshall has made his law; now let him enforce it." Anton
Chroust, Did President Jackson Actually Threaten the Supreme Court of the United States with Non-
enforcement of Its Injunction Against the State of Georgia?, 4 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 76 (1960).
Congress was also institutionally unprepared to deal systematically with Indian tribes. Congress
mostly dealt with tribes through individual treaties. See also supra note 74. In the Marshall Trilogy,
Chief Justice Marshall was the first to recognize the federal government's trust obligation to the
Indian tribes.
228. See, eg., Blatchford, 111 S.Ct. at 2589 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Fundamentally,
the vindication of Native American rights has been the institutional responsibility of the Federal
Government since the Republic's founding."); United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 645 (1977)
("[e]lassifications singling out Indian tribes as subjects of legislation are expressly provided for in the
Constitution and supported by the ensuing history of the Federal Government's relations with the
Indians.") (emphasis supplied); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 236 (1974) ("The overriding duty of
our Federal Government to deal fairly with Indians wherever located . . .") (emphasis supplied);
Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296 (1942) ("[Tlhis Court has recognized the dis-
tinctive obligation of trust incumbent upon the Government in its dealings with these dependent and
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol71/iss3/6
INDIAN GAMING AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
the liberal construction canon to expand the canon's application to
Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, if a Supreme Court decision can
be interpreted to have more than one meaning, some meanings with det-
rimental effects and some meanings with favorable effects on the tribes,
the favorable interpretation must be adopted in the context of Indian
affairs.
Applying this proposed rule to the Eleventh Amendment-Indian gam-
ing cases, states would be unable to raise an Eleventh Amendment de-
fense to section 2710(d)(7) and would be subjected to the jurisdiction of
the federal courts. The Seminole Tribe interpretation of Union Gas22 9 -
the interpretation most favorable to the tribes-would dictate that Con-
gress has the right to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity when legis-
lating pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause, just as Congress has this
authority when legislating pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Clause.
IGRA, enacted pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause, therefore,
would defeat any attempt by the states to raise a jurisdictional defense,
including an Eleventh Amendment defense.
Both of these proposed judicial solutions to the Eleventh Amendment
dilemma in Indian gaming cases are modest. For over 150 years, courts
have applied the canon of liberal statutory construction. 230 There is no
reason why this rule should not be applied to IGRA, which was specifi-
cally enacted for the tribes' benefit.2 31 Additionally, the canon only ap-
plies in Indian cases. With respect to IGRA, the canon suggests only
that IGRA should be construed liberally in favor of the Indian tribes.
Moreover, the liberal construction canon can only be expanded to
Supreme Court precedent in Indian cases. For example, although Union
Gas should be interpreted in the tribes' favor for Eleventh Amendment-
Indian gaming cases, in non-Indian contexts, alternative interpretations
might be permissible. Finally, this liberal precedent rule would apply
only to Supreme Court decisions. The proposed rule stems from the
sometimes exploited people.") (emphasis supplied); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384
(1886) ("This [duty of protection by the federal government] has always been recognized by the
Executive and by Congress, and by this court ...") (emphasis supplied).
Additionally, Congress recognizes that it shares its plenary power with the other governmental
branches. Senator Daniel Evans declared, "The entire Federal Government owes a trust obligation
to the tribes .... " S. REP. No. 446, at 3105.
229. See supra notes 185-92 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 218-19 and accompanying text.
231. It is quite possible that the courts simply overlooked this rule of statutory construction.
Felix Cohen has noted that courts often fail to apply this canon. See supra note 219.
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Court's unique role, as a branch of the federal government, in relation to
Indian tribes. The rule would not apply to state court decisions and
would arguably not even apply to decisions of lower federal courts,
which have not had such a unique relationship with the tribes.232
VI. CONCLUSION
The future of class III Indian gaming depends on whether states con-
tinue to refuse to negotiate tribal-state compacts and the manner in
which the federal courts respond to the states' jurisdictional challenges to
IGRA. The states now have the upper hand in their disputes with In-
dian tribes because no court has analyzed the issue correctly.233 How-
ever, as this Note suggests, the Indian tribes actually have the more
persuasive, historical arguments working to their advantage. By apply-
ing the statutory construction canon to IGRA, courts in the future will
realize that through section 2710(d)(7), Congress may override the states'
Eleventh Amendment defense and subject the states to the jurisdiction of
the federal courts. Perhaps this same result can be achieved by ex-
panding the liberal construction rule to Supreme Court precedent. By
adopting one or both of these approaches, courts will fulfill the purposes
of IGRA by enabling tribes to earn much-needed revenue through class
III gambling activities.
T Barton French, Jr.
232. Unlike the Supreme Court, neither state nor lower federal courts have assumed the role of
guardian of Indian tribes. See supra note 74. The states' role has traditionally been inimical to the
Indian tribes, and the Supreme Court alone, through the Marshall Trilogy, developed the trust-
guardian doctrine.
233. Currently, the Sault Ste Marie Tribe, Spokane Tribe, Ponca Tribe, and Seminole Tribe
decisions are on appeal in the Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeal,
respectively.
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